University of Kentucky

UKnowledge
Institute for the Study of Free Enterprise
Working Papers

Institute for the Study of Free Enterprise

11-2018

Nominal GDP versus Price Level Targeting: An Empirical
Evaluation
James S. Fackler
University of Kentucky, jamesfackler@gmail.com

W. Douglas McMillin
Louisiana State University, eodoug@lsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/isfe_papers
Part of the Economics Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Repository Citation
Fackler, James S. and McMillin, W. Douglas, "Nominal GDP versus Price Level Targeting: An Empirical
Evaluation" (2018). Institute for the Study of Free Enterprise Working Papers. 12.
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/isfe_papers/12

This Research Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Institute for the Study of Free Enterprise at
UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Institute for the Study of Free Enterprise Working Papers by an
authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

Nominal GDP versus Price Level
Targeting: An Empirical Evaluation
James S. Fackler
W. Douglas McMillin
November 2018
Revised December 2019

Institute for the Study of Free Enterprise
Working Paper 18

University of Kentucky
244 Gatton College of Business and Economics
Lexington, KY 40506-0034
http://isfe.uky.edu/

Nominal GDP versus Price Level Targeting: An Empirical Evaluation

James S. Fackler
Department of Economics (Emeritus)
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506-0034
USA
jamesfackler@gmail.com
Corresponding Author

W. Douglas McMillin
Department of Economics (Emeritus)
Louisiana State University
Baton Rouge, LA 70803-6306
USA
eodoug@lsu.edu

Abstract
In response to the ongoing discussion in the literature of the appropriate framework for monetary policy,
we compare two of the most frequently discussed alternatives to inflation targeting—targeting either the
level of nominal GDP or the price level—within the context of a simple vector autoregressive (VAR)
model. Our approach can be considered a constrained-discretion approach. The model is estimated using
quarterly data over the period 1979:4-2003:4, a period in which the economy was buffeted by substantial
supply and demand shocks. The paths of the federal funds rate, nominal GDP, real GDP, and the price
level under nominal GDP and price level targeting are simulated over the 2004:1-2006:4 period. We
evaluate nominal GDP and price level targeting by computing the values of simple loss functions. The
loss function values indicate that closely targeting the path of nominal GDP based on 4.5% desired
growth in nominal GDP produces noticeably lower losses in the simulation period than either price level
targeting or a continuation of the implicit flexible inflation targeting monetary policy that characterized
the estimation period.
Keywords: Nominal GDP Targeting, Price Level Targeting, Central Bank Policies, Monetary Policy
Objectives
JEL Codes: E31; E37; E52; E58
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1. Introduction
The Federal Reserve’s monetary policy framework before and after the 2008 financial crisis has
often been characterized as flexible inflation targeting, a policy of constrained discretion that, before the
crisis, contributed to a low, stable rate of inflation around the target rate of 2 percent and to modest
fluctuations of output around estimates of potential output. Unfortunately, this good macroeconomic
performance was not sufficient to ensure financial stability. This fact, along with the slow recovery of the
United States and other economies from the recession associated with the financial crisis, and inflation
persistently below target for the last decade, has led to suggestions that the Fed should replace flexible
inflation targeting with targeting the path of the level of nominal GDP or with targeting the path of the
price level, policy approaches that their advocates argue would have been promoted a faster post-crisis
recovery.1
Our objective in this paper is to analyze and compare targeting the path of the level of nominal
GDP with targeting the path of the price level for a recent period, 2004 – 2006. We assess the statistical
merits of both policies in the context of a single econometric framework, a simple vector autoregression
(VAR) estimated using quarterly data over the 1979:4-2003:4 period of implicit inflation targeting by the
Fed. Specifically, in the context of the policy planning process summarized by Blinder (1997), we use the
VAR to conduct counterfactual experiments consisting of 1,000 trials—dynamic, stochastic out-of-sample
simulations—in which we compute policy interventions needed to keep the targeted variable within
specified tolerance bands, reflecting constrained discretion, for both nominal GDP and price level
targeting.2 For these alternative strategies, we compute a sequence of monetary policy innovations
consistent with each strategy and then use these innovations along with representative historical shocks to

Conceptual discussions of the implications of nominal GDP targeting and price level targeting for monetary policy
aren’t presented in this paper since our focus is purely empirical. General discussions of these types of targeting can
be found in, among others, Bean (1983), Bradley and Jansen (1989), Hall and Mankiw (1994), Kahn (2009), Mester
(2018), and Fackler and McMillin (2019). Bernanke (2017) discusses a variety of recent proposals for changing the
monetary policy framework including a temporary price level target.
2 Precedents in the literature that use counterfactual simulations in VARs to evaluate policy alternatives include
Christiano (1998), Fackler and Rogers (1995), and Fackler and McMillin (2011). Kilian and Lütkepohl (2017)
provide a thorough discussion of the use of counterfactual simulations in VARs.
1
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the other variables to compute the simulations. For each experiment we seek answers to the following
questions: (1) Which policy approach, targeting nominal GDP or targeting the price level, best achieves
the Fed’s dual mandate in terms of real GDP and the price level?3 (2) How do the simulation results
compare with results of a “continuation policy” consistent with a simple dynamic forecast over the
simulation period? (3) Is the policy path needed to target nominal GDP or the price level “reasonable” or
is the degree of interest rate variability implausible? In the extreme, is there instrument instability? (4) Do
the changes in policy strategy lead to a perception by agents that a Lucas-type regime change has
occurred? (5) Is either type of policy, a nominal GDP target or a price level target, obviously preferred to
the other? Is either preferred to the continuation policy? We summarize our results using three variants of
an ad hoc (but common) loss function with different weights on the squared deviations of real GDP and
the price level from their specified target paths.4
Given the Federal Reserve’s medium-to-long-run inflation target of 2%, we assume a 2%
inflation rate underlies the price level target. For nominal GDP, we consider three targets based on growth
rates of 4.5%, 5%, and 5.5%. A 2.5% rate of growth in real GDP underlies the 4.5% growth rate along
with the 2% inflation rate, and rates of growth in real GDP of 3% and 3.5% underlie the 5% and 5.5%
nominal GDP growth, respectively. We find that, for both 1% and 2% tolerance bands around the targets,
nominal GDP targeting based on a desired 4.5% rate of growth in nominal GDP is superior to a policy
aimed solely at the price level and to the “continuation policy.” However, as detailed below, for higher
desired rates of nominal GDP growth, the relative rankings of the policies reveal some ambiguity. In
addition, while the policy instrument for attaining our targets, the federal funds rate, fluctuates within
historical norms, adjustments to the funds rate needed to attain either the nominal GDP or the price level
objective are, at the outset of the simulation periods, larger than the usual 25 basis point adjustments

While the formal mandate is expressed in terms of maximum employment and stable prices, we adopt the common
approach of focusing on real GDP in place of employment. Since the mandate does not explicitly state the relative
weights on these objectives, we will experiment with several alternatives.
4 Detailed below, the weighting schemes are characterized as representing the dual mandate, “Keynesian”
preferences, and “Classical” preferences.
3
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typical of monetary policy. Thus, the cost of attaining the nominal GDP or price level objective may be
initially greater variability in market rates of interest.
In a growing literature, several recent papers stand out as particularly relevant to our work. Using
a small variant of the FRB/US model, English, Lopez-Salido, and Tetlow (2015) compare the
performance of the economy when the Fed follows a rule based on nominal income targeting to outcomes
from an optimal commitment strategy to the performance based on an inertial Taylor rule. Under
conditions similar to those faced by the Fed in the fall of 2012, their simulations suggest that the paths of
the federal funds rate, core PCE inflation, the unemployment rate, and the output gap are closer to those
associated with the optimal commitment strategy under nominal income targeting than with the inertial
Taylor rule. However, they express concerns about the effects of data revisions on the effectiveness of
nominal income targeting.
Benchimol and Fourçans (2019) evaluate a DSGE model using a variety of policy rules including
Taylor rule variants, nominal GDP growth rate targets, and level nominal GDP targets. Their evaluation is
in the form of a variety of loss functions for the central bank and household welfare measures. When
using the central bank loss function, which is the weighted sum of the variances of inflation, the output
gap, interest rate changes, and wage growth as the criterion, level nominal GDP targets generally perform
best.
In two variants of a New Keynesian model, Garín, Lester, and Sims (2016) investigate the
welfare implications of targeting rules for nominal GDP, inflation, and the output gap that are special
cases of a standard Taylor rule. The targeting rules are compared with those for a standard Taylor rule. In
virtually all cases for both models, output gap targeting does best, although nominal GDP targeting is a
close second in most cases. They argue that successfully implementing an output gap rule is likely not
feasible because of difficulties in accurately measuring the output gap in real time and difficulties in
communicating the rule to the public. In a practical sense, their results suggest that nominal GDP
targeting is a preferred alternative to inflation targeting or a standard Taylor rule.

4

Hendrickson (2012) argues that the stabilization of inflation in the U.S. in the 1980s was achieved
by a commitment to low, stable rates of growth in nominal GDP. He embeds into two alternative DSGE
models an interest rate rule in which the current value of the federal funds rate is a function of its lagged
value and the rate of change in nominal GDP and finds that the volatility of both inflation and real GDP
decline the stronger the response of the Fed funds rate to nominal income. Beckworth and Hendrickson
(forthcoming) find that nominal GDP targeting is superior to use of the Taylor rule in real time.
Finally, Bodenstein and Zhao (forthcoming) utilize a medium-size DSGE model to compare a
variety of policy strategies including inflation targeting, price level targeting, nominal GDP targeting, and
Walsh’s (2003) speed limit policy in which the policymaker is concerned with stabilizing inflation and
the change in the output gap. They consider policymaking under commitment and under discretion and
compute the welfare implications of each policy. Under commitment, inflation targeting is slightly
preferred to the speed limit policy. These two policies are preferred to both price level targeting and
nominal GDP targeting, but price level targeting dominates nominal GDP targeting. Under discretion, the
speed limit policy is the best overall.
The literature just cited compares nominal GDP targeting, price level targeting, and inflation
targeting by analyzing the macroeconomic effects of formal rules specific to each type of targeting that
are embedded in a variety of DSGE models. A strong point of this approach is that it respects the Lucas
critique and allows expectations endogenous to the model to adjust to the specific rule. However,
although central banks often use the settings of their policy instrument implied by a variety of different
rules as inputs to their policy deliberations, in practice no major central banks have yet adopted an explicit
rule, and, arguably, none are likely to do so in the near future. Given that flexible inflation targeting, the
strategy employed by many central banks today, is implemented in a constrained-discretionary way, it is
plausible that, if adopted, nominal GDP targeting or price level targeting would be implemented in a
similar way. Rather than follow the cited studies and use a variant of a DSGE model to evaluate nominal
GDP and price level targeting, we follow the suggestion of McCallum (1988) that alternative strategies be
evaluated within a variety of different types of models and employ a pure time series model in which we
5

assume that the same type of constrained discretion that guides the Federal Reserve’s flexible inflation
targeting framework also would guide the implementation of either nominal GDP targeting or price level
targeting.
Since we evaluate a change in policy strategy from implicit flexible inflation targeting to nominal
GDP or price level targeting, the Lucas critique is potentially applicable. However, as noted by Leeper
and Zha (2003) in their discussion of modest policy interventions, as long as the new strategies don’t
result in markedly different behavior by the Federal Reserve and hence don’t significantly alter private
agents’ beliefs about the policy regime, counterfactual simulations using the VAR can be a viable way to
evaluate these strategies. We compute the modesty statistic suggested by Leeper-Zha (2003), which
analyzes the statistical properties of the policy innovations. Intuitively, relative to policy shocks in the
historical regime, if the policy innovations needed to transition to the new policy regime are sufficiently
large and persistent, agents in the economy are likely to perceive that a change in regime has occurred,
obviating the usefulness of the historical data. To determine if the Lucas critique is applicable to the
counterfactual policy innovations that attain our hypothesized objectives for nominal GDP or price level
target, we compute the modesty statistics and find sufficiently small values to suggest that our results may
not violate this critique.5
We proceed as follows. In section II, we present the VAR model to be estimated and discuss its
impulse response functions. In section III, we provide an intuitive discussion of the counterfactual
methodology employed to assess the relative merits of nominal GDP versus price level targeting;
technical details are included in an appendix which is available on request. Empirical results are included
in section IV, and section V concludes.

As noted by Leeper and Zha (2003), small values of the modesty statistic are necessary, but not sufficient, to allow
researchers to discount concern about the Lucas critique. This should be kept in mind in interpreting our results.
5
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2. The Empirical Model
We estimate a six-variable vector autoregression (VAR) that includes typical macro activity
variables, monetary policy variables, and a measure of bond financing costs for nonfinancial firms.
Specifically, the data series used in the analysis are the log level of the Commodity Research Bureau spot
market price index for all commodities, the log level of the GDP deflator, the log level of real GDP, the
effective federal funds rate (FFR), a measure of the money stock represented by the log level of MZM,
which comprises the components of money with zero maturity,6 and the Gilchrist-Zakrajšek (2012) excess
bond premium, a credit spread that in other work has been deemed important in explaining economic
activity.
Commodity prices are included to help mitigate the well-known “price puzzle” often found in
VAR models. In the spirit of the monetary economics of Friedman and Brunner and Meltzer, Nelson
(2003, p. 1029) argues for the inclusion of money in macro models as a “proxy for the various
substitution effects of monetary policy that exist when many asset prices matter for aggregate demand.”
The money supply measure thus potentially captures information about monetary conditions not fully
reflected in FFR. In its policy decisions, the Fed is concerned not only about the state of the
macroeconomy but also about the state of financial markets and their links to the real economy.
Consequently, when identifying monetary policy shocks, it seems important to include a proxy for
concern about financial markets in the model, and we include the excess bond premium as this proxy.
Favara et al. (2016) note that the excess bond premium, which removes the default risk of individual
firms from the Gilchrist-Zakrajšek corporate bond market credit spread, captures credit market sentiment
toward the general level of corporate credit risk. The excess bond premium is a forward-looking variable
that reflects investors’ expectations about future corporate defaults, which in turn depend on expectations
about future corporate profits, employment, investment, and aggregate economic activity. Favara et al.

6

Specifically, MZM equals M2 less small time deposits plus institutional money market mutual fund deposits.

7

(2016) summarize evidence that indicates an important effect of this variable in explaining economic
activity.7
Since our focal point is targeting nominal GDP or the price level, it is natural to use real GDP and
the GDP deflator in our basic model. As noted, other than FFR and the excess bond premium that are
included in levels, we estimate the model in log levels. We will either target the sum of the logs of real
GDP and the GDP deflator or, alternatively, just the log of the deflator.8 We recognize that recent policy
has aimed more at the personal consumption expenditures index, but use of the deflator is appropriate for
an initial investigation given its formal role in defining nominal GDP. In addition, in the original
proposal of the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993), the focus for the inflation variable was the deflator rather than
narrower, consumer-focused indexes.
The model was estimated using quarterly data for the time period 1979:4–2003:4. The starting
point corresponds to the period initiated by the special Saturday night FOMC meeting at which thenFederal Reserve chair Paul Volcker refocused monetary policy on reducing the inflation rate. Our ending
date for estimation allows us to investigate counterfactual policies that begin in a low interest rate
environment, the FFR target having been 1 percent between mid-2003 and mid-2004, much as current
policy normalization began with short-term interest rates just above zero. Among other things, this setting

7

Although the explicit measure of the excess bond premium was not introduced until after our estimation period
ended, we employ it for three reasons. First, as revealed in minutes of FOMC meetings and public statements of Fed
officials, there has been a long-standing concern among policy makers about the state of financial markets and the
implications for the macro economy in general. Second, the detailed information needed for construction of the
excess bond premium was available beginning in 1973; see Gilchrist-Zakrajšek (2012.) It is econometrically
efficient to include a single measure as a proxy for the state of financial markets. Third, Favara et al. (2016) find that
the excess bond premium helps predict future economic activity and serves as a leading indicator for recessions.
They find that the predictive content of the Gilchrist-Zakrajšek corporate credit spread for economic activity stems
solely from the excess bond premium; the default risk of individual firms has no explanatory content. Based on these
results, we used the excess bond market premium rather than the Gilchrist-Zakrajšek corporate credit spread.
8 Since an integral part of our exercise includes the dynamic forecast of the VAR, we estimate in log levels, noting
the recommendation of Lin and Tsay (1996). They argue that while the best forecasts are those that include the
correct unit roots and cointegrating relationships, “when applied to real data, the results change. . . . Because the
available cointegration tests have low power in rejecting the unit root hypothesis when the time series has
characteristic roots close to 1, the danger of mis-imposing unit root constraints is real” (p. 537). More recently,
Gospodinov, Herrera, and Pesavento (2013) argue that “the unrestricted VAR in levels appears to be the most robust
specification when there is uncertainty about the magnitude of the largest roots and the co-movement between the
variables.”
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also allows us to see if the zero bound on the nominal rate is encountered in our counterfactual
experiments. Ending the estimation in 2003:4 also allows us three years for out-of-sample simulations
with which to form initial impressions of the relative advantages of nominal GDP and price level
targeting before early signs of the financial crisis began to appear in 2007. Four lags of all variables were
employed and were sufficient to whiten the residuals of the equations of the VAR.9
The Federal Reserve is assumed to respond contemporaneously to the variables directly related to
its dual mandate, but only with a lag to variables it doesn’t directly target. Monetary policy shocks are
identified as innovations to FFR using a Choleski decomposition with the ordering listed earlier. Thus, in
the identification scheme, a contemporaneous response by the Federal Reserve to movements in the
macro variables (commodity prices, the inflation rate, and output) is allowed, but the Federal Reserve is
assumed to respond only with a lag to movements in the monetary aggregate and the excess bond
premium. We note that since the Fed paid little attention to monetary aggregates over the estimation
period it seems reasonable to assume no contemporaneous response to MZM. Recall that, following
Nelson (2003), MZM is included as a proxy for the effects of monetary policy on asset prices other than
bonds. Efficient markets considerations also suggest ordering MZM after FFR. Ordering the excess bond
premium after the fed funds rate assumes that the Fed responds only to sustained changes in credit market
sentiment about corporate credit risk and not to perhaps transitory contemporaneous changes.10

Lag length was determined in the following way. We started from Doan’s (2014) recommendation that at least a
year’s worth of lags be included in the VAR and then used the degrees-of-freedom multiplier-corrected version of
the AIC criterion to determine if longer lags of 5 or 6 quarters should be employed. The AIC suggested 4 lags was
optimal. However, we also computed the point estimates of the impulse response functions for a shock to monetary
policy for both 5 and 6 lags in the VAR. These point estimates were almost always within the confidence intervals
for the 4-lag model; the few elements of the point estimates that weren’t within the confidence intervals were barely
outside the intervals. Consequently, we decided to focus on the 4-lag model. The impulse responses for the 5- and 6lag models are available on request.
10 Because commodity prices are largely determined in world commodity markets, shocks to U.S. monetary policy
are constrained not to have any contemporaneous effect on commodity prices but are allowed to have possible
lagged effects on them. In the commodity price equation in the VAR, the F-statistic for jointly significant effects of
the lagged fed funds rate on commodity prices is 0.84 with a significance level of 0.5. In fact, the only set of lagged
values that are significant in the commodity price equation are lagged commodity prices. Nevertheless, following a
referee’s suggestion, we estimated a structural VAR in which bi-directional contemporaneous effects between the
fed funds rate and commodity prices were allowed. Adding a contemporaneous coefficient for the fed funds rate to
the commodity price equation required eliminating a contemporaneous coefficient elsewhere, and we eliminated the
direct contemporaneous effect of commodity prices on MZM. This constrains any contemporaneous effect of
9

9

The pattern of effects of monetary policy shocks is as expected. A contractionary monetary
policy shock, a rise in the funds rate, persists for several quarters but weakens and dies out as expected if
the Fed responds to the negative output and price level effects of the initial contractionary shock. MZM
falls at first and then returns to its initial level, as do commodity prices. The contractionary monetary
policy shock has a negative and long-lived, but ultimately transitory, impact on real GDP and a delayed
and then persistent negative impact on the GDP deflator. As expected, contractionary monetary policy,
which pushes the economy into a transitory but long-lived recession, leads to a deterioration in the credit
market’s assessment of general corporate credit risk and hence to a transitory increase in the excess bond
premium. A plot of the impulse response functions with one standard deviation confidence intervals is
presented in an appendix which is available on request.

commodity prices on MZM to indirect contemporaneous effects through a contemporaneous effect of commodity
prices on the fed funds rate and then from the funds rate on MZM. Not too surprisingly, given the F-test results and
the fact that the coefficient on the contemporaneous shock to the funds rate in the commodity price shock equation
was not significantly different from zero, the IRFs for this structural VAR system are essentially identical to the
ones presented in the appendix. This appendix is available on request.
Although we believe the arguments in the text and earlier in this footnote justify ordering commodity prices first
and the excess bond premium last, following a referee’s suggestion, we also swapped the ordering of commodity
prices and the excess bond premium. The IRFs for a contractionary monetary policy shock are within the confidence
bands for the ordering in the paper except for the first several quarters for commodity prices.
The sensitivity of the results to the Choleski method of identifying monetary policy shocks was checked by
imposing structural constraints similar to those imposed by Leeper and Roush (2003). Three different structural
identification schemes were examined, and each differed from the Choleski method only for the MZM and FFR
equations. In the first scheme, the MZM equation was interpreted as a real money demand function by imposing the
following constraints: no contemporaneous effect of the commodity price shock or the excess bond premium shock
on real money demand, a contemporaneous coefficient of –1.0 on the log GDP deflator shock (which converts the
log nominal MZM shock to a real money demand shock), and nonzero coefficients on the real GDP shock and the
FFR shock. Thus, real money demand is specified to be a function of real GDP and FFR. In addition, in this first
scheme, all model variables except the excess bond premium shock were allowed to affect the FFR shock
contemporaneously. This configuration of the FFR equation thus allows MZM to affect FFR contemporaneously.
Maximum likelihood estimation of this first structural model found a positive effect of real GDP and a negative
effect of FFR on real money demand. Positive contemporaneous effects of commodity prices, the GDP deflator, and
real GDP on FFR were found, and the effect of MZM on FFR was negative.
The second structural identification scheme imposed the same constraints as the first scheme for the MZM
equation, and, in the FFR equation, eliminated the contemporaneous effect of MZM on FFR. The third structural
identification scheme differed from the second by imposing a Taylor-rule-like structure on the FFR equation: the
effects of commodity prices, MZM, and the excess bond premium on FFR were set to zero and the only nonzero
effects allowed were for the GDP deflator and real GDP. For both the second and third identification schemes, the
signs of the effects of real GDP and FFR on real money demand were the same as in the first, and the effects of the
included variables in the FFR equation were all positive. Shocks to the FFR equation were interpreted as monetary
policy shocks in all three structural alternatives, and impulse response functions (IRFs) for all three were essentially
the same as those reported in the text for the Choleski decomposition which, for simplicity, is used hereafter. The
methodology described in Section III below can be adapted in a straightforward way for shocks from structural
identification schemes.
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3. Methodology
We determine the path for the nominal interest rate over a planning horizon that maintains
average nominal GDP (the price level) within a desired range, a tolerance band around a target path
specified by the policy maker. A byproduct of the policy path is that we also produce counterfactual paths
for all system variables associated with the average nominal GDP (price level) target.
Our approach to finding the path for the nominal rate that achieves the desired outcomes for
nominal GDP (the price level) and the implications for the rest of the variables in the estimated system is
an application of the policy planning process described by Blinder (1997):
First, you must plan an entire hypothetical path for your policy instrument from now until
the end of the planning horizon, even though you know you will activate only the first
step of the plan. It is simply illogical to make your current decision in splendid isolation
from what you expect to do in subsequent periods. Second, when next period actually
comes, you must appraise the new information that has arrived and make an entirely new
multiperiod plan. If the surprises were trivial, that is, if the stochastic errors were
approximately zero, step one of your new plan will mimic the hypothetical step two of
your old plan. But if significant new information has arrived, the new plan will differ
notably from the old one.
We expect this ‘first step’ to be especially interesting when considering adoption of a new policy
approach, such as moving from an inflation target to a nominal GDP or price level target. Prior to such an
adoption, the policy maker would like to know whether the proposed policy is acceptable when
considering the implied paths and volatility of system variables, especially the variables included in the
central bank objective function such as the Fed’s dual mandate. In addition, the policy maker would like
to know whether there would be instrument instability in the policy tool as well as whether adoption of
the alternative approach would encounter Lucas critique issues, which if present may render existing data
uninformative in the evaluation process.11
We start with a generic structural model of the form:
Yt  A0Yt  AY
1 t 1    ApYt  p  t

Blinder’s “second step,” which occurs after the passage of a time period, is more likely informative within a
policy regime rather than when considering adopting a new regime.
11

11

where Yt is an nx1 vector of variables, the Ai are nxn matrices with A0 including the contemporaneous
structural components of the model, and ut is the corresponding vector of structural shocks, which are
mutually and serially uncorrelated and zero in expected value. Our objective is to find values for the
structural shocks to the policy equation (the innovation in the federal funds rate in our application) which
allow the policy maker to attain a chosen path for a target variable (either nominal GDP or the price
level). In our application, as noted above, we use a Choleski decomposition as our structure, though our
technique can be applied to linear structural models in general.
To develop intuition, consider a two-variable structural VAR identified with a Choleski
decomposition. Let the first variable be the target and the second the policy variable. Following a
common assumption in the literature that the policy variable affects target variables like nominal GDP or
prices only with a lag but responds contemporaneously to these variables, the matrix A0 is then

 0 0
A0  
.
a
0
0,21


Assuming for simplicity of illustration there is only one lag in the structural model (in the generic model
above the Ai = 0 for i>1) and assuming the model is estimated through period t with the dynamic
simulations beginning in period t+1, our equations are:
Y1,t 1  a1,11Y1,t  a1,12Y2,t  1,t 1
Y2,t 1  a0,21Y1,t 1  a1,21Y1,t  a1,22Y2,t   2,t 1

Note that the policy innovation 2,t 1 has no impact on Y1,t 1 . However, through Y2,t 1 , this innovation will
alter the target variable in period t+2; specifically, advancing to period t+2 the innovation of 2,t 1 alters
Y1,t 2 through its impact on Y2,t 1 .
Y1,t  2  a1,11Y1,t 1  a1,12Y2,t 1  1,t  2

12

*
A target value for Y1,t 2 of Y1,t 2 is achieved by finding the policy innovation, 2,t 1 , that sets the
*
value of the policy instrument in t+1 to be Y2,t 1 such that

Y1,*t 2  a1,11Y1,t 1  a1,12Y2,*t 1  1,t 2
*

*

Solve for Y2,t 1 , the value of the policy variable that will achieve Y1,t 2 :

 1  *
Y2,*t 1  
Y a Y 
 a   1,t 2 1,11 1,t 1 1,t 2 
1,12


But, in t+1, policymakers don’t know 1,t 2 . If they assume shocks to Y1 in the future will be similar to
past shocks, they could randomly draw from past shocks to Y1 as a proxy for 1,t 2 . Define the shock that
is drawn as ˆ1,t 2 .

Thus,

 1  *
Y2,*t 1  
Y  a Y  ˆ
 a   1,t 2 1,11 1,t 1 1,t 2 
1,12



*
* sys
*
From Y2,t 1  a0,21Y1,t 1  a1,21Y1,t  a1,22Y2,t   2,t 1 , we can write Y2,t 1  Y2,t 1   2,t 1 where

Y2,*tsys
1  a0,21Y1,t 1  a1,21Y1,t  a1,22Y2,t is the systematic response of the policy variable to current and past
*
values of the model variables and 2,t 1 is the innovation in monetary policy (i.e. the deviation above or
* sys
*
*
*
* sys
below Y2,t 1 ) required to achieve Y2,t 1 . Thus,  2,t 1  Y2,t 1  Y2,t 1 .12 Under our assumptions about the

structural shocks, solving for the optimal policy innovation will have no implications for the other
structural shocks.13

12

We note that the systematic portion the policy variable,

Y2,*,tsys
1 , can be computed as the dynamic forecast or base

projection of the reduced form of the structural model.
13 In contrast, if the policy maker mistakenly solved for the reduced form shock consistent with an estimated reduced
form VAR, there would be unwanted consequences for the other reduced form shocks due to the contemporaneous
correlations between these reduced form disturbances. That is, imposing a policy “innovation” in this fashion would
affect other system variables in a complicated manner.

13

Similarly, in period t+3, the value of the target variable will depend on Y2,t 2 . Using the
*
computed value Y2,t 1 as the own lag in the expression for Y2,t 2 then incorporates the policy innovation
*
*
*
from period t+1, 2,t 1 , which is in turn incorporated into the computation of Y1,t 3 and hence  2,t  2 .

Continuing in this fashion, conditional on using random draws from the structural residuals for the shocks
to the target variable, the policy maker can compute the values of the policy innovations needed to
achieve the ‘entire hypothetical path for your policy instrument from now until the end of the planning
horizon, even though you know you will activate only the first step of the plan’ as suggested by Blinder.
Furthermore, as emphasized by Blinder, computing the consequences of the policy over the entire horizon
is necessary as ‘[i]t is simply illogical to make your current decision in splendid isolation from what you
expect to do in subsequent periods.’
The example above implies that the ‘entire path’ for the policy innovation can be computed by
taking a random draw of a vector shocks to the target variable sufficient to cover the planning horizon.
Using this draw, we would have one trial for the system given the desired path of the target and the policy
needed to achieve this path. Repeating this process by taking new random draws allows computation of
similar paths, each consistent with the target path, leading to an average path for the economy along with
volatility around this path, assuming that the estimated residuals will be representative of the economic
shocks over the planning horizon.14 In our actual application below, we will perform 1,000 such trials.15
The simplified presentation above assumes that there are only two variables and that the policy
maker aims to attain the policy path period-by-period. In practice, a policy maker will take a longer-run
view when considering policy, so the period-by-period analysis above, while offering useful intuition, is

As noted earlier, if the policy maker plans on policy objectives different from those in the estimation period,
agents in the economy may be alerted to a regime shift. The implication of the Lucas critique is that such
simulations will not be valid since the evolution of the economy in the new regime will differ from the old, so that
the residuals upon which we rely may not be representative. We address and test for this possibility below.
15 In our empirical approach, rather than using the VAR directly, for computational reasons we instead transform the
VAR to its moving average representation (MAR) and conduct our counterfactual experiments using that alternative
framework. The results are, of course, identical to those implied by the VAR. Detail is included in an appendix
which is available on request.
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unrealistic to use in a real-world application assessing targets for nominal GDP or the price level. Rather,
the policy maker in our analysis has a medium-term objective to be achieved on average rather than
precisely each quarter.16 Specifically, we assume the objective is to maintain nominal GDP (the price
level) within a specified tolerance band around a target path, allowing quarterly GDP (the price level) to
violate the band in the short run as long as any deviation is offset during another period(s) during the
policy horizon.
Our application allows for a medium-run policy horizon and constrained discretion, roughly
mimicking important portions of the current policy regime. We specify a desired path for the target
variable beginning at the historical value at the end of the estimation period, along with a tolerance band
around the path. For example, we could target the price level rising at 2 percent per year from the most
recent historical value, and then construct a plus/minus 1 percent tolerance band around that path. For
period t+1, using a draw from the estimated system residuals, including that for the policy variable, we
construct the counterfactual path over a 12 quarter horizon (periods t+1 through t+12), and ask whether
any of the computed 12 quarters violates the band without being offset during another quarter in the
horizon.17 Consistent with a policy maker tolerating temporary deviations from the target, if the violation
is offset in other periods within the horizon, no policy intervention in period t+1 is undertaken; that is, the
policy innovation from the random draw is retained. If, however, violations are not offset, we compute a
policy innovation for period t+1 that will produce a path for the target variable so that any deviations over
the twelve-period horizon are offset. The innovation for the policy instrument (either the residual from the

For example, Federal Reserve officials have indicated a tolerance for temporary deviations from its inflation goal
by declaring that its objective for inflation is “symmetric” around its goal of 2% inflation over the medium term.
17 Two obvious alternatives to random draws from the estimated residuals deserve mention. One option is to set
them to their expected values of zero. Of course, this option is not interesting if the policy maker would like to know
about the inherent variability of the alternative policy path based on the estimated volatility of the equation
disturbances. A second option is to assume a particular probability distribution for the shocks to each variable and
take random draws from these distributions. This option requires a possibly arbitrary choice of a probability
distribution from which to draw. The option used here, employing values drawn randomly from the estimated
residuals (transformed to their structural values), being linear transformations of the reduced-form OLS residuals,
are zero mean. They also have the advantage of reflecting the statistical characteristics of the data, avoiding
misspecification that would likely occur with the selection of a probability distribution that may not reflect the data.
16
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draw or the computed policy innovation as appropriate) will be retained for the next period in the
analysis. For period t+2, we maintain the 12 quarter horizon that continues to reflect the medium term
policy horizon (periods t+2 through t+13), and use the drawn shocks conditional on the policy shock for
period t+1 (as above) for the system to again ask whether the tolerance band is violated by a sufficiently
large amount to require a policy intervention. If not, then the drawn shock for the policy equation is
retained; if a violation of the band occurs that is not offset elsewhere in the horizon, then we compute a
policy shock that will achieve the objective. The final period in our planning horizon, period t+12 in our
case, continues to use mix of policy innovations and drawn shocks for the prior periods in evaluating the
final medium-term horizon, periods t+12 through t+23.
We monitor the simulations for violations of the zero-lower bound.18 Specifically, in our
experiments the policy evaluations begin in a period with a 1 percent fed funds rate, and we investigate
the frequency of violations of the zero-lower bound. Our hope is to provide initial information about
whether price level, nominal GDP targets, or both are feasible without violating a lower bound in light of
the low levels of interest rates in the decade subsequent to the financial crisis of 2007-2009, a topic of
interest given the Fed Listens events in the first half of 2019 and the conference at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago in June, 2019 examining policy tools and strategies.
A potential shortcoming of our approach arises when we replace policy shocks drawn from the
estimated residuals with computed shocks needed to attain the policy objective. If the computed policy
innovations are implicitly from some other probability distribution, they may lead agents to infer a change
in the policy regime, an issue raised by the Lucas critique. If so, our estimated model might not be

Until the financial crisis, many viewed zero as the lower bound (the ZLB) for the policy interest rate. Of course,
during the crisis, some central banks found that the policy rate could be set somewhat below zero—the effective
lower bound (ELB). In the U.S., the policy rate never fell below zero. Using simulations of two Fed models
employing alternative interest rate rules (an estimated rule and the Taylor rule) and assuming a policy setting with
low nominal and real interest rates along with low inflation, Kiley-Roberts (2017) find nontrivial probabilities (at
most 20 percent) of hitting the ELB. Lubik, Matthes, and Price (2018) use simulations of a time-varying parameter
VAR to estimate the probability of hitting the ZLB over a 40-quarter forecast horizon that begins in the third quarter
of 2018. They find a 15 percent chance of the economy being at the ZLB in the long-run, and about a 25 percent
chance that all forecasted paths of the funds rate hit the ZLB at least once over their forecast horizon.
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relevant for the simulation period. To test for this possibility, we compute and report the “modesty
statistic” introduced by Leeper and Zha (2003) to evaluate whether our policy interventions would have
likely been viewed by agents as “modest” and hence unlikely to have led to an inference of a change in
the policy regime. Technical details are in an appendix which is available on request.

4. Results
4.1 Overview of the Experiments
We conducted several different experiments each for nominal GDP targets and price level targets.
These experiments reflect combinations of target rates and widths of the tolerance band for each targeted
variable. We begin with a description of the targets and the tolerance band selections and then provide
additional details on the loss function metrics used for evaluation and on monitoring for violations of the
zero-lower bound. We also roughly mimic the policy makers’ use of the Tealbook by evaluating a key
comparison: rather than adopting either a nominal GDP or a price level target, what are the effects of a
“continuation policy,” where we never intervene and instead let the draws for the policy equation, which
represent estimated policy innovations, determine the policy implemented each quarter. Without
interventions, then, this policy is a continuation of existing policy conditional on the representative
shocks to the policy equation.19
The selected targets for nominal GDP and the price level all show rising values over time. For a
nominal GDP target, rising nominal GDP objectives reflect the desires for both rising real GDP and
modest increases in the price level. A policy maker selecting a realistic nominal GDP target would do so
against the backdrop of estimates of the path of potential GDP, reflecting a wide variety of factors such as
projected productivity growth, demographic changes, and commitments on fiscal spending. In addition,
the nominal GDP objective must at least implicitly incorporate an objective for increases in the price
level. For a price level target, we expect that the rate of increase will be consistent with the recent

19

Note that these simulations mimic the base projections since the residuals from which we sample are zero mean.
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inflation target, with the additional commitment to offset inflation “misses” by returning the price level to
the desired path rather than letting bygones be bygones.
For nominal GDP for our base case, we target a growth rate of 4.5 percent per year, consistent
with slowing productivity growth and an aging population. Following Hatzius and Stehn (2011), this 4.5
percent rate of growth is based on an assumed potential real GDP growth rate of 2.5 percent and a 2.0
percent inflation target.20 Furthermore, given current policy discussions about transitioning to a nominal
GDP or price level target starting from a policy rate near zero, a relatively modest objective for the
transition period seems reasonable. We have also investigated rates of nominal GDP growth of 5.0
percent and 5.5 percent as well, continuing to assume a 2.0 percent inflation objective, so by implication
of the purposes of our loss function computations, real growth of 3.0 percent or 3.5 percent, respectively.
The standard deviation for growth rates of nominal potential GDP reported by the Congressional Budget
Office was 0.4 for the decade prior to the simulations, 0.8 for the 15-year period prior, and 2.2 for the
estimation period. For this initial assessment, around each target path for nominal GDP, we use tolerance
bands of ±1 percent or ±2 percent. Both bands aim at using policy to maintain nominal GDP growth
above zero.
For the price level target, 2.0 percent has been a common target for inflation across the advanced
economies, including the United States, and we use this value in defining the target path for the price
level. However, targeting prices to grow at 2.0 percent usually corresponds to a measure of consumer
prices. Here, consistent with nominal GDP targets, the GDP deflator is a natural alternative. The GDP
deflator over the estimation period rose at a rate of about 3.3 percent. In the decade and a half prior to our
simulation, it rose at a rate of 2.3 percent, and in the decade prior it rose at a rate of about 1.8 percent.
Using 2.0 percent as the inflation rate that defines the price level target path is thus not only consistent
with publicly stated objectives for consumer prices, it is also within the range of the rate of change in the

We note that Kohlscheen and Nakajima (2019), using a time-varying parameter VAR model, estimate the current
steady-state growth of U.S. real GDP as 2.4%, essentially the same value as we employ.
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GDP deflator for the period leading to the simulation dates. We specify bands around the target path for
the price level of ±1.0 and ±2.0 percent, avoiding an absolute decline in the price level.
To construct the target paths of nominal GDP the price level, we use the 2003:4 value of the
relevant variable and then assume the target grows according to the growth rates discussed above.21 We
then measure for each trial the root mean squared deviation (RMSD) for real GDP and the price level
around their specified trends. We compare and contrast nominal GDP targets versus price level targets in
detail, first by comparing the RMSDs of the trials across the various target paths and tolerance bands.
Since weighted averages of mean squared deviations (MSDs) of output and the price level around their
specified growth paths are broadly consistent with loss functions employed in standard dynamic
optimization problems, we also compute three alternative values for loss functions that are the weighted
sum of the MSDs of output and the price level around their specified growth paths. We compute one with
equal weights on the MSDs of real GDP and the price level (the “dual mandate weights”), one with
weights of 0.75 on real GDP and 0.25 on prices (the “Keynesian weights”), and one with weights of 0.25
on real GDP and 0.75 on prices (“Classical weights”).22 We similarly compute MSDs for the continuation
policy and the associated loss functions, where for purposes of comparison, the MSDs of this policy are
computed relative to the trend values used for the various nominal GDP and price level targets. Finally,

We chose 2003:4 as the base for computing the target path of the price level and the level of nominal GDP since
we wanted to focus on how monetary policy and economic activity would have differed in the immediate run-up
(2004:1-2006:4) to the recent financial crisis if a new monetary policy strategy had been implemented several years
before the crisis. However, as noted by Mester (2018), among others, the target path of the price level or the level of
nominal GDP at a given moment in time can differ substantially depending on the starting point for computation of
the target path.
22 A referee suggested that the use of the mean squared deviation of the price level from its target path was
inappropriate and that the loss function should instead have the mean squared deviation of the inflation rate from its
target. However, we specified the model in levels, so a loss function that contained squared deviations of the level of
price and output from target seemed natural to use, especially since two of the three policies we consider (and which
are the primary focus of our analysis) are “level” policies—price level targeting and targeting the level of nominal
GDP. Furthermore, although the Federal Reserve specifies a target for the inflation rate, it is straightforward to
translate this target to a desired path for the price level. In addition, the Federal Reserve’s dual mandate refers to
stable prices so that a loss function that contains price level deviations from target may be closer in intent to the
spirit of the dual mandate than one that contains deviations of inflation from target. Finally, we note that, for the
case of price-level targeting, Svensson (1999; forthcoming) and Bodenstein-Zhao (forthcoming) specified the central
bank loss function with the squared deviation of the price level, rather than the inflation rate, from target as an
argument.
21
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although negative policy rates became commonplace in some countries during and subsequent to the
financial crisis, negative rates were not employed in the United States. To see whether our simulations
evolving from FFR of 1 percent at the end of the estimation period entailed negative rates in the
simulations, for each experiment we report the number of periods in which the interest rate must be set
below zero to attain the objective for that experiment and, when this occurs, the minimum value for the
target rate.
For each experiment, we conducted 1,000 simulations, evaluating both the average policy paths
and the response of the economy to nominal GDP targets or price level targets. As noted in the
introduction, we seek answers to the following questions. For each experiment: (1) Which policy
approach, targeting nominal GDP or targeting the price level, best achieves the Fed’s dual mandate in
terms of real GDP and the price level? (2) How do the simulation results compare with results of a
“continuation policy” consistent with a simple dynamic forecast over the simulation period? (3) Is the
policy path needed to target nominal GDP or the price level “reasonable” or is the degree of interest rate
variability implausible? In the extreme, is there instrument instability? (4) Do the changes in policy
strategy lead to a perception by agents that a Lucas-type regime change has occurred? (5) Is either type of
policy, a nominal GDP target or a price level target, obviously preferred to the other? Is either preferred to
the continuation policy?

4.2 Targeting Nominal GDP
Our first experiment is an investigation of a nominal GDP target. We specify a target path for
nominal GDP growth along with a tolerance band and examine the implications for real GDP and the
price level of using monetary policy to attain the nominal GDP objective. In addition, we analyze the
interest rate path needed to attain the nominal GDP path. The analysis is based on 1,000 trials, which
allow us to compute the variabilities of nominal GDP, real GDP, the price level, and the interest rate. In
addition, we ask whether the policy as implemented would have violated the Lucas critique.
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Having estimated our model through 2003:4, for our base case we target average nominal GDP
growth of 4.5 percent at an annual rate for 2004:1 through 2006:4. In the context of recent history, Figure
1 shows this target path along with tolerance bands that are 1 percent above and below target. This target
path is approximately in line with nominal GDP movements prior to our simulation period. However,
while unknown to a policy planner at the end of 2003, in retrospect, this target path would have been
somewhat restraining over the simulation period.23 What could have been computed, however, is the
simulated path for the continuation policy, which will be included in the figures below, consistent with
policy-making that compares current policy with an evaluation of alternatives.

[Figure 1 about here]

The solid line in Figure 2 (a) shows the results for average quarter-by-quarter nominal GDP based
on 1,000 simulations in which policy is conducted to maintain average 12-quarter nominal GDP inside
the prespecified bands. As indicated in the description of the methodology, the computed policy shocks
may allow individual quarterly values of the targeted variable to move outside the specified band (the
dashed lines in Figure 2 (a)), as is evident in the first four quarters of the simulation. After the first year of
the simulation, on average nominal GDP lies within the tolerance bands and offsets the values of nominal
GDP above the bands over the twelve-quarter policy horizon.24 The dotted line shows the nominal GDP
path for the continuation policy, which is above the upper tolerance band in every quarter in the
simulation period. Thus, the continuation policy path suggests that, on average, the policy pursued over
the model estimation period would not have kept nominal GDP within 1.0 percent of the 4.5 percent

The target path relative to the actual evolution of the economy suggests that early and restrictive intervention in
the simulation period will likely be needed. We present evidence on the pattern of interventions below.
24 As speculated above, of the 1,000 trials in our base case, it was necessary to intervene 990 times in the first
quarter of the simulations, 2004:1. Subsequently, there were 11 in the second quarter, with none again until 2005:3,
when the number gradually rose to 179 in 2006:4. Total interventions in the base case were 1,413 of the 12,000 total
quarters in the horizon.
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nominal GDP target path. Since our methodology selects a path for the policy shocks that attains this
objective, once we have computed the path for the policy innovations that satisfies the policy objective,
along with the other shocks from the trial draw we can trace the paths of all system variables, including
those in Figures 2 (b) – (d).
[Figure 2 about here]
The solid line in Figure 2 (b) shows the average path for FFR associated with the policy objective
and the dotted line shows the average path for the continuation policy. Figures 2 (c) and 2 (d) show the
real and price components of the nominal GDP path. As is evident from Figure 2 (b), attaining the
specified nominal GDP target requires an immediate and relatively large increase in FFR. In the average
simulation, FFR rises to over 6.5 percent during the first year and then gradually declines. In contrast, this
was a period in which the Fed was raising the funds rate target “at a measured pace” from the prior floor
of 1.0 percent. Furthermore, the rise in the computed average policy rate (though not its magnitude) is in
the direction suggested by critics, often appealing to the Taylor rule, who argued at the time that rates
were too low for too long during the 2003–2004 period. The range of the simulated fed funds rate is
reasonably close to what transpired, though the pattern is quite different. We note that the average paths
for FFR for both the continuation policy and the nominal GDP target are noteworthy for their large
upward movements, inconsistent with the appearance of interest rate smoothing in the data. Whether
policy makers would be willing to raise rates as aggressively as indicated in our experiments is an open
question.25
The solid line in Figure 2 (c) shows average real GDP given the policy shocks needed to attain
the nominal GDP target and the dotted line shows the average real GDP for the continuation policy. The

The large initial increases of the federal funds rate shown in Figure 2 (b) (along with a similar pattern shown in
Figure 4 (b) below for the case of price level targeting) may overstate the rise in the policy rate if a level target
policy was adopted. A referee has pointed out that it is possible that credible establishment of nominal GDP or price
level targeting may lead to a smaller likelihood of deviations of nominal GDP or the price level from target if the
public believes monetary policymakers will do whatever is necessary to achieve the targets. These smaller
deviations in turn may mean that monetary policymakers may not have to intervene by as much as our simulations
suggest. Consequently, the simulation paths of the funds rate in Figures 2 and 4 may be upper bounds.
25
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restraint needed to maintain nominal growth inside the tolerance range induces a shallow recession, with
output falling between the fourth quarter of 2004 and the second quarter of 2005 at an annual rate of
about 1.1 percent, and then exceeding the previous peak by the fourth quarter of 2005. From the trough in
2005:2 until the end of the simulation, annualized output growth is 2.4 percent.
In Figure 2 (d), the solid line shows the path for the GDP deflator implied by the policy shocks
needed for the nominal GDP target and the dotted line shows the average path for the continuation policy.
Annualized inflation implied by the path of the price level is 2.3 percent over the simulation period.
As noted earlier, the dotted line Figure 2 (a) shows the continuation policy path of nominal GDP.
The targeted policy discussed above clearly restrains nominal GDP relative to the continuation policy
path.26 Consistent with the continuation policy path for nominal GDP being higher than the path with the
explicit target value, the continuation policy path of the fed funds rate is substantially less contractionary
over the initial two quarters than with nominal GDP targeting and then follows approximately the same
path over the remainder of the horizon. Real GDP and the price level are persistently higher than with the
nominal GDP target, as would be expected in light of the different initial paths of FFR. For the
continuation policy case, real GDP falls at an annual rate of 1.4 percent between 2004:4 and 2005:2, with
annualized growth until 2006:4 from the trough of 2.1 percent. The price level rises over the period at an
annual rate of 2.5 percent. So, while the continuation policy case has a higher level of nominal GDP, it
has a modestly deeper recession, grows less rapidly subsequently, and has moderately higher inflation.
Table 1 contains additional information about the base-case nominal GDP and the continuation
policy (and other) experiments. Several characteristics of these experiments warrant comment. First, there
is no apparent “instrument instability” in the funds rate. Specifically, for a nominal GDP growth target of
4.5 percent and the ± 1 percent tolerance band, the average standard deviation of the policy rate across the
trials is just marginally higher (1.80) than the actual standard deviation (1.61) over the period.
Nonetheless, among the 12,000 quarters across the 1,000 trials, the maximum and minimum values

The alternative paths are identical over the first quarter due to the Choleski decomposition, which places the
policy variable lower in the ordering than the target variables.
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ranged from -0.10 percent to 8.57 percent. In contrast, the corresponding range for the continuation policy
was 0.06 percent to 8.62 percent (and the historical range was 1.0 percent to 5.25 percent). Second, there
is only one instance in these 12,000 quarters in which the funds rate was set below zero, just marginally
with a value of -0.10 percent. Despite the actual funds rate being 1.0 percent at the outset of our
simulations, these results appear to allow a transition to the nominal GDP targeting regime without
sustained instances of negative policy rates. Third, panel A of Table 1 reports the absolute values of the
maximum computed Leeper-Zha modesty statistics.27 For our base-case nominal GDP analysis, there does
not appear to be concern regarding the Lucas critique. Our intuition is that while the range of interest rates
in our experiments is wider than actually experienced, with the standard deviation of our experiment
being roughly the same magnitude as actually occurred, those outside the actual range were sufficiently
rare that the Lucas concerns were not of importance.

[Table 1 about here]

Table 2 presents average RMSDs for real GDP and the price level and Table 3 presents the loss
function results for the nominal GDP targeting base case as well as for the continuation policy and other
experiments. We note that the average RMSD for real GDP for the nominal GDP targeting base case is
essentially the same as for the continuation policy, but for the price level, the average RMSD is about
16% lower for the nominal GDP targeting base case compared to the continuation case. From Table 3 we
see that for all three weighting schemes—Dual Mandate, Keynesian, and Classical—the base-case
nominal GDP targeting produces a lower loss than the continuation policy.

We make one adjustment to their computation. Specifically, we use the randomly drawn disturbances to the other
equations, with our policy interventions conditional on these disturbances, rather than assuming that the shocks to
the nonpolicy equations are all zero (though our estimation, equivalent to OLS equation by equation, implies
expected values of zero for these shocks). We do so since our computed policy interventions are conditioned on the
drawn residuals in each trial.
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[Table 2 about here]
[Table 3 about here]

As noted earlier, we have also considered higher targeted growth paths for nominal GDP of 5.0
percent and 5.5 percent based on alternative assumptions about the growth rate of real potential GDP. The
results for these higher nominal GDP growth paths are summarized in Tables 1, 2, and 3. From Table 1,
we note that the average standard deviations of the funds rate for these alternatives are greater than for the
base case of 4.5 percent growth, although the increases appear to be negligible. The range of interest rate
values rises somewhat with an increase in the target growth rate, as does the number of quarters with a
negative interest rate. The Leeper-Zha statistics for the higher growth rates remain less than 2.0 in
absolute value, so again there do not seem to be substantial Lucas critique concerns for the interest rate
changes associated with the higher growth rates. However, we see from Table 2 that the average RMSDs
for both real GDP and the price level for target nominal GDP growth of 5.0 percent and 5.5 percent are
greater than for 4.5 percent growth but are, with one exception, below those for the continuation policy.
From Table 3, we see that the loss function values are substantially different. For 5.0 percent growth,
across the different weight schemes, the loss function values are 36.0 percent to 38.0 percent higher than
for 4.5 percent growth and are 42.0 percent to 57.0 percent higher for 5.5 percent growth than for 4.5
percent growth. Again, however, the loss function values for nominal GDP targets based on both 5.0
percent and 5.5 percent growth are less than the comparable continuation policy results.
We also considered a wider tolerance band of 2 percent. In Table 1, we see that the average
standard deviations of the funds rate are lower for the wider 2 percent band than the 1 percent band, and
the range of interest rate values is often smaller than for the 1 percent band since there are fewer policy
interventions under the wider band. As would be expected for the wider band, there are fewer quarters
with a negative interest rate; for 4.5 percent and 5.0 percent growth in nominal GDP, there are no quarters
with a negative interest rate. The results presented in Table 2 reveal that the average RMSDs for real GDP
and the price level for the different target growth rates of nominal GDP for the 2% tolerance band are in
25

four instances higher and in two instances lower than for the 1% tolerance bands. For the 2% tolerance
bands, the average RMSDs for the nominal GDP targets are comparable in magnitude to those for the
continuation policy whereas for the 1% band, they were lower in all but one instance. However, the loss
function values presented in Table 3 are always higher for the 2 percent tolerance band than for the 1
percent tolerance band across all weight schemes and nominal GDP growth rates. For 4.5 percent growth,
the loss function values are 6.0 percent to 25.0 percent higher across the weight schemes for the 2 percent
tolerance band than for the 1 percent band; for 5.0 percent growth, the range is 7.0 percent to 11.0 percent
higher, and for 5.5 percent growth, the range is 9.0 percent to 51.0 percent higher. For the 2% tolerance
band and for all weight schemes, the loss function values for 4.5 percent nominal GDP growth remain
below those for the continuation policy whereas for 5.0 percent growth they are essentially equal to those
for the continuation policy but are below those for the continuation policy for 5.5 percent growth.
The loss function values in Table 3 provide the most comprehensive evaluation of the nominal
GDP targeting results and suggest that, for our estimation period, simulation period, and model, a 4.5
percent nominal GDP target growth rate with a 1 percent tolerance band around the target level of
nominal GDP delivers better results than nominal GDP targets of 5.0 percent or 5.5 percent or a tolerance
band of 2 percent and generally better results than a continuation over the simulation period of the type of
policy that characterized the estimation period.

4.3: Targeting the GDP Deflator
Our second experiment analyzes a target path for the price level. Similar to the analysis of the
nominal GDP target, we specify a target path for the GDP deflator along with a tolerance band and
examine the implications of using monetary policy to attain the targeted price level objective.
Specifically, we analyze the interest rate path needed to attain the price level goals along with the
implications of this path for real GDP. The analysis again is based on 1,000 trial simulations. As before,
we ask whether the policy as implemented would have violated the Lucas critique.
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Consistent with 2 percent inflation targets at major central banks around the world for much of
the past several decades, and having estimated our model through 2003:4, we target price level growth of
2 percent with tolerance bands, alternatively, of ± 1 percent and ± 2 percent. While unknown to a policy
planner at the end of 2003, this target path, specified to be about the same pace as then-recent historical
values, would have been somewhat restraining over the simulation period; Figure 3 shows the target path
with ± 1 percent tolerance bands, which we refer to as the base case for price level targeting.

[Figure 3 about here]

Average results for the 1,000 trials are shown in Figures 4 (a) – 4 (c). We begin with Figure 4
(a), which shows the quarter-by quarter average path for the price level under our base case price level
target (solid line) and under continuation policy (dotted line). We note that with the continuation policy,
after three quarters, the price level rises above the upper tolerance band and remains above for the rest of
the simulation. Price level targeting gradually lowers the price level to a value within the tolerance band.
As noted earlier, under price level targeting, the 12-quarter average price level meets the criterion set out
in the methodology discussion, and this criterion does allow the quarter-by quarter price level to move
modestly outside the tolerance band, although in each quarter it is below the price level implied by the
continuation policy. Given recent references by Fed policy makers to a “symmetric” goal for policy
around the 2% objective, we expect that policy makers would tolerate such temporary, modest deviations
of the price level from the tolerance band. Inflation over the simulation period is 2.2 percent, close to the
2.0 percent rate that defined the target path for the price level.28

[Figure 4 about here]

As with nominal GDP, we again anticipated restrictive interventions early in the period to move the price level
along its target path. For the base case, we intervened in each of the 1,000 trials in both 2004:1 and 2004:2, in 880
trials in 2004:3, and in 34 trials in 2004:4 with no interventions in later periods. So, the total interventions for the
price level target were 2,914.
28
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Figure 4 (b) shows that, as expected from the fact that price level targeting generates a price level
path below that of the continuation policy, monetary policy is initially substantially tighter under price
level targeting than with the continuation policy. In 2004:1, the value of FFR implied by price level
targeting is approximately 6.5 percent compared to a value slightly below 3.0 percent for the continuation
policy. In 2004:2, under price level targeting, FFR is raised to almost 8.0 percent, whereas it rises to
slightly above 5 percent under the continuation policy.29
The tight policy under price level targeting reduces real GDP with a slight lag (Figure 4 (c) and
begins to restrain the rise in prices relative to the continuation policy (Figure 4 (a)). Under price level
targeting, the initial decline is 1.3 percent, followed by growth in 2006 of 3.0 percent. The annualized rate
of inflation for our price level target over the simulation period is 2.2 percent, somewhat below the 2.5
percent annualized inflation rate under the continuation policy.
The decrease in real GDP is followed by cuts to FFR for both the targeting and the continuation
policy approaches. Under price level targeting, after rising initially, FFR is cut in 2004:3 and the cuts
continue until 2005:1, when FFR approximately levels out at a value slightly above 2 percent. With the
continuation policy, FFR is increased to about 6.5 percent in 2004:3 (which is about the same value FFR
is reduced to under price level targeting) and is cut in 2004:4 and thereafter. From about 2005:3 to the end
of the simulation, FFR under price level targeting is actually below the values implied by the continuation
policy. Although FFR is higher for a longer period of time under continuation policy than under price
level targeting, for the continuation policy the peak in FFR is lower, the downturn in real GDP is smaller
and less long-lived (two versus four quarters), and the recovery, which begins in 2005:2 for both policies,
is weaker than for price level targeting.

For our base cases, visual comparison of Figures 2 (b) and 4 (b) shows that the price level target on average
requires an interest rate over the first year of the simulation period about one percent higher than required for the
nominal GDP target. Table 1, panel B, shows that the maximum interest rate across the trials is 100 basis points
higher for the price level target for the base cases.
29
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Table 1 also contains information about this policy experiment. First, as before, there is no
apparent “instrument instability” in FFR. Specifically, for the ± 1 percent tolerance band, the average
standard deviation of policy across the trials is higher (2.23) than the actual standard deviation (1.61) over
the period and the standard deviation for the continuation policy (1.58). Among the 12,000 quarters across
the 1,000 trials, the highest interest rate needed was about 9.6 percent compared with an actual maximum
of 5.25 percent. Second, there are only three instances in the 12,000 quarters in which FFR was set below
zero, and just marginally (-0.06 percent). Despite the actual FFR being 1 percent at the outset of our
simulations, as with nominal GDP targets, these results appear to allow a transition to the price level
targeting regime without worry of sustained instances of negative policy rates. Also consistent with the
nominal GDP target, we note that the path of FFR differs substantially from the smooth rise in the actual
value of FFR over the simulation period and again question whether policy makers would move from a
policy of modest adjustments of 25 basis points in order to attain the price level target. The absolute
values of the maximum computed Leeper-Zha modesty statistics in Table 1, panel A indicate that, as was
the case for nominal GDP targeting, there does not appear to be concern regarding the Lucas critique.
As with nominal GDP targeting, we also considered a 2 percent tolerance band for price level
targeting. For price level targeting, the average standard deviation of FFR (Table 1, panel A) falls sharply
for a 2 percent tolerance band relative to the 1 percent band and is essentially the same as for nominal
GDP targeting of 4.5 percent, with a 2 percent tolerance band. The range of values of FFR for a 2 percent
price level targeting tolerance band is now less than the range for nominal GDP targeting with a 2 percent
tolerance band, and there are no periods in which a negative interest rate is required. With the price level
objective, the average RMSD for real GDP falls when the tolerance band is widened from 1 percent to 2
percent (Table 2), but it rises for the price level. In Table 3, the loss function value for price level
targeting for a 2 percent band is substantially lower than for a 1 percent band for the dual mandate and
Keynesian weights but is only slightly less for Classical weights. Regardless of the weight scheme or the
size of the tolerance band, loss function values for price level targeting are greater than those for the
continuation policy. For the 1% tolerance band, the loss function values for price level targeting are
29

greater than those for nominal GDP targeting except for nominal GDP targeting associated with 5.5
percent growth and Classical weights. For all threes weight schemes, the loss function values for price
level targeting with a 2 percent band are greater than those for nominal GDP targeting of 4.5 percent with
a 2 percent band and higher than the best results for the same nominal GDP target but with the 1 percent
band for all weighting schemes. The results are mixed for the 2% tolerance band when price level
targeting is compared with nominal GDP targeting of either 5.0 percent or 5.5 percent growth.
We have also experimented with higher targeted growth paths for the price level. Generally, since
we are starting with a relatively low interest rate at the outset, these cases required a substantial number of
negative interest rates to attain higher price level objectives. As an example, when the price level is
targeted to grow at a 2.6 percent rate with a ± 1 percent tolerance band, 1,305 quarters of the 12,000
across the trials required a negative rate to attain the objective. With a target growth in the price level of 4
percent, 4,874 quarters required a negative rate.30 In addition, these alternatives fare poorly in terms of the
ability to implement them without raising substantial Lucas critique objections. Examples such as these
raise the question, given the model specification, of whether policy can emerge from a low interest rate
environment by raising the price level objective over time, as suggested by some in the current
environment.

4.4: Should There Be a Preference?
As we saw in the previous section, qualitatively, the effects of nominal GDP and price level
targeting are similar. There are, however, some quantitative differences for the simulated paths of the key
variables, real GDP and the price level. Both policies generate a brief downturn in real GDP followed by
a recovery, and both restrain the increase in the price level relative to the continuation policy. Under
nominal GDP targeting, the downturn is only two periods in duration (2005:1-2005:2), and real GDP falls

While inflation averaged 3.3 percent over the estimation period, we evaluate a 4.0 percent price level growth
objective in light of some proposals to at least temporarily raise the inflation target above 2.0 percent. Our guess is
that 4.0 percent is the likely upper bound policy makers would tolerate given the potential loss of credibility for
policy of rates higher than this and given the costs of returning inflation to the longer-run 2.0 percent objective.
30

30

by $77.2 billion. Real GDP peaks in 2004:2 under price level targeting, and a trough is reached in
2005:2. Real GDP declines by $187.3 billion. Thus, under price level targeting, the recession is longer
and deeper than with nominal GDP targeting. With the continuation policy, real GDP falls in 2005:1 and
2005:2 and the decrease in real GDP is $100.3 billion. Price level targeting generates a decrease in real
GDP that is 2.4 times the decrease under nominal GDP targeting and 1.3 times the decrease with the
continuation policy. Although both targeting policies generate a price level below that of the continuation
policy, the price level at the end of the simulation period is somewhat lower for price level targeting than
for nominal GDP targeting. However, the annualized rate of inflation over the simulation period is about
the same for nominal GDP and price level targeting. Across trials, inflation averages 2.3 percent for
nominal GDP targeting and 2.2 percent for price level targeting; the continuation policy generates a
moderately higher rate of inflation of 2.5 percent.
Comparing Figures 2 (b) and 4 (b), we note that although the pattern of adjustment of the funds
rate is similar under both types of targeting, policy is initially tighter under price level targeting than
under nominal GDP targeting (a maximum funds rate of almost 8.00 percent in Figure 4 (b) vs. about 6.75
percent in Figure 2 (b)) and that both types of targeting generate initially tighter policy than for the
continuation policy (a maximum funds rate of about 6.50 percent). We also note that the average standard
deviation of FFR under price level targeting (2.23) is higher than under nominal GDP targeting (1.80),
and both are moderately higher than for the continuation policy (1.58) or for the actual standard deviation
(1.61). Over the simulations, the spread between the maximum and minimum values of the funds rate is
comparable, although the range is somewhat wider for price level targeting than for nominal GDP
targeting. The number of quarters with a negative funds rate is negligible for both types of targeting using
the base case parameters for the targeting experiments. The Leeper-Zha statistics suggest that the Lucas
Critique is not an issue for the base cases.
Table 2 shows the RMSDs for the various experiments, computed around trend values as
specified earlier. Table 2 indicates that for the price level objective for the ± 1 percent tolerance band, the
RMSDs are notably different than for the base case for nominal GDP targeting. In particular, the RMSD
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for real GDP is nearly twice as large as for the nominal GDP target example, while the price level RMSD
is about 20 percent lower. The tighter control of the price level is not surprising, given that the price level
is the objective of this experiment.
Table 3 presents the values of the loss functions associated with the dual mandate, Keynesian,
and Classical preferences. In Table 3, a comparison of the loss function values across different policy
strategies reveals that for both 1% and 2% tolerance bands around the targets, nominal GDP targeting
based on a desired 4.5% rate of growth in nominal GDP is superior to a policy aimed solely at the price
level and to the continuation policy. The smallest loss function value in Table 3 is for nominal GDP
targeting based on a desired 4.5% rate of growth in nominal GDP and a 1% tolerance band. We also see
that the loss function values for nominal GDP targeting for all weight schemes rise as the tolerance band
width increases from 1% to 2%, and the performance of nominal GDP targeting relative to the price level
and continuation policies deteriorates the higher the rate of growth in nominal GDP.31 However, for a 1%
tolerance band and 5% nominal GDP target, nominal GDP targeting is still preferred to both the price
level target and the continuation policy, and, for a 1% tolerance band and 5.5% nominal GDP target,
nominal GDP targeting is preferred to the price level target and the continuation policy except for
Classical weights, where the nominal GDP target is tied with the price level target, but is still preferred to
the continuation policy. For a 2% tolerance band and 5% nominal GDP target, the nominal GDP target,
price level target, and continuation policy are essentially tied for all weight schemes. For the 2% tolerance
band and 5.5% nominal GDP target, the price level target is preferred for all weight schemes to both the
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Higher rates of nominal GDP growth allow for greater variability in inflation and output. To understand the
contributions of output and price variability to total loss, we computed the separate contributions to total loss of the
weighted squared deviations of output and price from their respective targets for each weight scheme and tolerance
band. These separate contributions were derived from the RMSDs by squaring the RMSDs and applying the relevant
weights to the sum of the squared deviations of output and price from their respective targets. The results are
presented in an expanded Table 3, found in the appendix which is available on request. Not surprisingly, it shows
that as the specified target growth on nominal GDP rises, the squared deviations of both real GDP and the price level
rise. However, for the 1% tolerance band, within a given weighting scheme, the relative contributions of real GDP
and the price level are approximately stable. For the 2% tolerance band, the relative contribution of output
variability rises and the relative contribution of inflation variability falls by either 19 percentage points (dual
mandate weights) or by 14-15 points (Keynesian and Classical weights) as target nominal GDP growth rises from
4.5% to 5.5%.
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nominal GDP target and the continuation policies, but the nominal GDP target is preferred to the
continuation policy.
Overall, our results suggest that a constrained-discretionary implementation of a level nominal
GDP target based on 4.5% nominal GDP growth achieved with tighter rather than looser precision is
preferred to a continuation of the implicit flexible inflation targeting of the period before the recent crisis
or to price level targeting. We reach this conclusion since (1) the lowest value of the loss function is
found for the level nominal GDP target based on 4.5% nominal GDP growth with a 1% tolerance band,
(2) the assumption about the rate of growth in real GDP of 2.5% underlying the 4.5% nominal GDP target
is more in line with recent estimates of a sustainable rate of growth in real GDP than the assumptions
about real GDP growth of 3% and 3.5% that underlie the 5% and 5.5% nominal GDP targets, (3) that with
the exception of one tie, nominal GDP targeting is preferred to the continuation policy of implicit flexible
inflation targeting, (4) that policy credibility is more likely to be established when consistently hitting a
tighter tolerance band than a looser one, and (5) that price level targeting is preferred to nominal GDP
targeting only when the tolerance band is 2% and real GDP growth that underlies the nominal GDP target
is a very optimistic 3.5%.

4.5: Was the Fed Implicitly Targeting Nominal GDP?
Our results in Table 3 are broadly consistent with the hypothesis and empirical results of
Hendrickson (2012) to the effect that the Federal Reserve under Paul Volcker adopted policy consistent
with controlling inflation and inflation expectations “by maintaining low, stable rates of nominal income
growth.” His supporting evidence includes both reduced form estimation and analysis of two DSGE
models, each of which embeds a rule that sets the fed funds rate as responsive to anticipated nominal
GDP growth as measured by Greenbook forecasts. In our analysis, we note that the loss function values
for the continuation policy evaluated against a 2% inflation rate and a 3% real GDP growth rate are
essentially the same as for our nominal GDP targets with a nominal GDP growth rate objective of 5% and
our wider tolerance bands. Even for 4.5% nominal GDP growth and the wide tolerance bands, the loss
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function values for this implementation of nominal GDP targeting and for the continuation policy are of
comparable magnitude. So, while our model suggests that policy would have produced better results with
a smaller tolerance band, the results for 4.5%-5% nominal GDP targeting with wide tolerance bands are
consistent with a correspondence between the continuation policy and a loose implementation of nominal
GDP targeting.32

5. Concluding Comments
This paper takes a different approach to evaluating nominal GDP and price level targeting than
the extant literature. Previous literature compares alternative policy rules mainly within New Keynesian
models. Following an earlier suggestion of McCallum (1988) that alternative strategies be evaluated
within a variety of different models including time series models, this paper evaluates nominal GDP and
price level targeting within a policy framework of constrained discretion using a vector autoregressive
model. Constrained discretion, rather than adherence to a formal rule, best describes the implementation
of policy today, and, in our view, is most likely to characterize policy implementation in the future.
Concerns about the applicability of the Lucas critique to our approach are mitigated by the low values of
the Leeper-Zha (2003) modesty statistics which analyze the statistical properties of the policy innovations
required to achieve either the nominal GDP or price level target.
Although we use a very different approach to evaluating nominal GDP and price level targeting,
our results are generally complementary to those in the literature we cited earlier. Our results suggest a
preference for a nominal GDP targeting strategy that closely rather than loosely targets a path of the level
of nominal GDP based on a 2.5% long-run rate of growth in real GDP and a desired inflation rate of 2%.
Alternatives considered included price level targeting, a continuation of the implicit flexible inflation
targeting that characterized the period over which we estimated our model, and path targets for the level
of nominal GDP associated with higher rates of nominal GDP growth. However, we do note some
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We are grateful to the editor for pointing out to us this feature of the results.
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ambiguity in the rankings of the nominal GDP and price level strategies when price level targeting is
compared to nominal GDP targets that are based on higher and perhaps less realistic growth rates of real
GDP and wider tolerance bands around the target path for nominal GDP or prices.
The evidence from our study that nominal GDP targeting, and to a lesser extent price level
targeting, outperforms a continuation of the implicit flexible inflation targeting of the period preceding
the most recent financial crisis in conjunction with evidence from earlier studies suggests that central
bankers should seriously consider nominal GDP and price level targeting as alternatives to flexible
inflation targeting as they periodically evaluate their policy strategies. In particular, the accumulating
evidence suggests that nominal GDP and price level targeting deserve careful evaluation in the Federal
Reserve’s current review of its monetary policy framework.
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Figure 1: Nominal GDP Targeting
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Figure 2: Nominal GDP Targeting
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Figure 4: Price Level Targeting

Table 1: Select Interest Rate Statistics, 1,000 Trials
A. Average Standard Deviation*†
Target Variable

% Rate of
Change

1. Level NGDP
2. Level NGDP
3. Level NGDP
4. Price Level
*
†

Tolerance Band
Width
± 1%
± 2%

4.5
5.0
5.5
2.0

1.80
1.83
1.92
2.23

1.58
1.64
1.64
1.57

Leeper-Zha
Statistic
± 1% / ± 2%
1.65 / 1.54
1.58 / 1.52
1.97 / 1.91
1.59 / 1.48

Actual: 1.61
Continuation Policy: 1.58

B. Minimum / Maximum Values*†
Target Variable

% Rate of Change

1. Level NGDP
2. Level NGDP
3. Level NGDP
4. Price Level
*
†

4.5
5.0
5.5
2.0

Tolerance Band Width
± 1%
± 2%
-0.10 / 8.57
-0.29 / 8.62
-0.62 / 8.47
-0.06 / 9.57

0.06 / 8.62
0.06 / 8.62
-0.67 / 8.62
0.22 / 8.42

Actual: 1.0 / 5.25
Continuation Policy: 0.06 / 8.62

C. Number of Quarters with Negative Rate*†
Target Variable

1. Level NGDP
2. Level NGDP
3. Level NGDP
4. Price Level
*
†

% Rate of Change

4.5
5.0
5.5
2.0

Actual: 0
Continuation Policy: 0
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Tolerance Band Width
± 1%
± 2%
1
3
13
3

0
0
9
0

Table 2: Average Root Mean Squared Deviations (RMSD), 1,000 Trials*†
RMSDs for Nominal GDP and Price Level
Targets

±1% band

±2% band

Continuation
Policy‡

Nominal GDP Target Growth: 4.5%
RMSD: Real GDP
RMSD: Price Level

1.23
1.18

1.21
1.37

1.26
1.40

Nominal GDP Target Growth: 5.0%
RMSD: Real GDP
RMSD: Price Level

1.45
1.37

1.54
1.40

1.55
1.40

Nominal GDP Target Growth: 5.5%
RMSD: Real GDP
RMSD: Price Level

1.43
1.51

1.88
1.44

2.20
1.40

Price Level Target Growth: 2.0%
RMSD: Real GDP
RMSD: Price Level

2.38
0.99

1.56
1.39

1.56
1.35

*

All values multiplied by e-02.

RMSDs are computed around the following trends. Target price level growth is always 2%, based on the actual
value in 2003:4. Also, starting from the actual 2003:4 value, real GDP growth trends are 2.5% for target nominal
growth of 4.5%, 3% for target nominal growth of 5%, and 3.5% for target nominal growth of 5.5%.
†

‡

RMSDs for the continuation policy experiment calculated around trends used for the growth targets in the
corresponding row.
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Table 3: Loss Functions
Type Loss Function/
Policy Objective

% Rate of
Changea

Loss Function Value*
Tolerance Band Width

Continuation
Policy**

±1%

±2%

4.5
5.0
5.5
2.0

1.45
1.99
2.17
3.33

1.67
2.16
2.80
2.18

1.76
2.17
3.39
1.76

4.5
5.0
5.5
2.0

1.48
2.04
2.11
4.50

1.57
2.27
3.17
2.31

1.67
2.28
4.11
1.67

4.5
5.0
5.5
2.0

1.41
1.93
2.22
2.15

1.77
2.06
2.43
2.06

1.86
2.06
2.67
1.86

A. Dual Mandate
Weightsb
1. Level NGDP
2. Level NGDP
3. Level NGDP
4. Price Level
B. Keynesian Weightsc
1. Level NGDP
2. Level NGDP
3. Level NGDP
4. Price Level
C. Classical Weightsd
1. Level NGDP
2. Level NGDP
3. Level NGDP
4. Price Level

*All

values should be multiplied by e-04.
Under the continuation policy, the loss function values for price level targeting with 2%
inflation and NGDP targeting with 4.5% growth are the same since these share common
trends of 2% growth for prices and 2.5% growth for real GDP around which the MSDs are
computed. For Level NGDP targets based on 5.0% and 5.5% growth, the loss functions are
based on a price path with 2% growth and real GDP growth of 3.0% and 3.5%, respectively.
**

a The

desired rate of change employed in computing the target path of the level of the
variable over 2004:1–2006:4. The 2003:4 value is projected forward as the target value at
the indicated rate of change.
b

Dual Mandate Weights: 0.5 on the variance of both output and the price level from target.

Keynesian Weights: 0.25 on the variance of the price level from target and 0.75 on the
variance of the output from target.
c

d Classical

Weights: 0.75 on the variance of the price level from target and 0.25 on the
variance of the output from target.
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